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INTRODUCTION

O Nthose
JANUARY 21, 1977, PRESIDENT CARTER PARDONED
who removed themselves from the United States

to avoid

induction for military service during the Vietnam era.' The pardon

restored full rights with certain exceptions. The accompanying
executive order directed the admission of aliens barred from entry

into the United States because they "have departed from or ...
remained outside the United States to avoid or evade training or
service in the armed forces in time of war or a period declared by the

President to be a national emergency." 2 Neither the pardon itself nor
the executive order says anything about citizenship. Nevertheless, it
was widely reported at the time that any pardoned person who had
3
become a citizen of another country would continue to be an alien. It

was reported that such people could visit the United States, and
might even become citizens, but in both respects they would be
treated as were :other aliens. The New York Times on the:other
hand, reported that only those draft evaders who had been "legally
declared to be 'undesirable aliens'" would be forced to recover their
citizenship as immigrants. 4 Both interpretations purported to report
t Associate Professor of Law, Villanove University School of Law. B.B.A.
University of Michigan, 1965; J.D., Detroit College of Law, 1968; LL.M., George
Washington University, 1969; LL.M., Columbia University, 1975.
1. Exec. Order No. 11,967, 42 Fed. Reg. 4393 (1977); Proc. No. 4483, 42 Fed. Reg.
4391 (1977). The presidential proclamation and its accompanying executive order are
reprinted in the New York Times. N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1977, at 10, col. 2.
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(22) (1970); see Exec. Order No. 11,967, § 3, 42 Fed. Reg. 4393
(1977). Although the executive order refers to any person, this statute covers aliens
exclusively.
3. See, e.g., Phila. Inquirer, Jan. 22, 1977, at 5, col. 3. The Inquirer quoted Jody
Powell, the White House Press Secretary, as saying: "[DIraft evaders who have
become citizens of another country are free to come home to visit their families. If they
wish to regain their citizenship, however, they will have to apply under the same
terms as any other alien. . . ." Id.; see NBC Nightly News for Jan. 21, 1977;
Trumbull, Evaders in Canada Call Action a Sham, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1977, at 11,
col. 1.
4. Mohr, Carter Pardons Draft Evaders, Orders a Study of Deserters, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 22, 1977, at 1, col. 6 & at 10, col. 2. This statement was also attributed to
Jody Powell and contradicted another Times report on the facing page. See Trumbull,
supra, note 3.
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the words of White House Press Secretary Jody Powell. Presumably
Mr. Powell was announcing the "official" interpretation of the
pardon's effect. Whichever version was the accurate report, however,
is immaterial, as both statements are wrong. Equally wrong is the
view espoused by the Foundation of Law and Society, seeking a
declaratory judgment that those who fled the country to avoid the
draft lost their citizenship. 5 Under the law regarding loss of
citizenship, the determination of loss does not depend on the
acceptance of citizenship elsewhere, nor on some "legal declaration"
of undesirable alienage, nor on leaving the country to evade the
draft. The first criterion sweeps too broadly: it includes many who
have not lost their citizenship. The second criterion is too narrow:
evaders other than those whose status has already been tested in
court will find that they have lost their citizenship. The third
criterion is simply irrelevant. The true criterion by which loss of
citizenship is tested for most citizens 6 is the determination of
whether there has been a "voluntary renunciation" of such citizen7
ship.
This article will consider the manner of proving voluntary
renunciation and attempt to relate this criterion to draft evaders.
This article seeks not to advocate what ought to be, but to discover
what is. It examines the several categories of draft evaders, for
many of whom citizenship status is clearly determined. However, it
will be shown that the citizenship of some draft evaders is so
uncertain that it may only be established finally by a decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States. This category includes
individuals who have neither elected to take other citizenship nor
expressly renounced their United States citizenship. In order to
determine which evaders fit into each category, and to appraise the
prospects of those evaders whose citizenship is uncertain, this article
will explore the parameters of voluntary renunciation. Before
developing a meaning of voluntary renunciation and ascertaining
the required proof for such renunciation, one must understand how
5. Daughtrey v. Carter, No. 77-0187 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 2, 1977); see Phila.
Inquirer, Feb. 3, 1977, at 5-D, col. 5. Apparently, the Foundation of Law and Society's
suit is based on 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(10) (1970). Apart from standing problems, plaintiffs
will have serious difficulties on the merits, as this section was held unconstitutional
in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). See note 27 infra.
6. The fourteenth amendment defines citizens as "[all persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof. . . ." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Persons who are naturalized outside the United States are
not protected in their citizenship by this amendment. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815
(1971). Hereinafter, unless otherwise indicated, the word "citizen" in this article refers
only to citizens as defined and protected by the fourteenth amendment. The special
problems of non-fourteenth amendment citizens will be considered only at the end of
the article. See text accompanying notes 131-36 infra.
7. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
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this came to be the only manner in which fourteenth amendment
citizens could lose their citizenship.
II.

A LITTLE MATTER OF VOTING

Great constitutional principles often begin as small events. In
our system, they often emerge from contests over rather ordinary
acts. If the actors involved refuse to accept the asserted consequences of their acts, the opportunity arises for these acts to become very
important if the Supreme Court seizes the chance to test a great
issue. The principle that constitutionally protected citizens cannot be
involuntarily expatriated emerged from such an ordinary event as
voting. To understand the principle, one must understand the stories
of two men: Clemente Perez and Beys Afroyim.
Clemente Perez was born in Texas of Mexican parents in 1909.
Therefore, he was a United States citizen. Apparently, he was also a
Mexican citizen. In any event, when he was ten years old, he and his
parents moved to Mexico. Mr. Perez knew of his United States
citizenship but preferred to stay in Mexico. When in 1941 certain
complications in the Pacific and Europe encompassed the United
States, he preferred not to become involved in the unpleasantness.
Thus, he did not register for the draft. In 1943, however, he applied
for admission into the United States as an alien railroad laborer,
stating in his application that he was a native-born citizen of
Mexico. He remained in the United States for about one year,
earning a good living because of the then existing labor shortage,
without risking involvement in the war. Mr. Perez returned to
Mexico and remained there from 1944 to 1947. In 1947, he applied to
enter the United States as a United States citizen. Unfortunately, he
had voted in Mexico in 1946. For this reason, 8 as well as for having
remained outside the United States to avoid military service during
time of war, 9 the Board of Immigration Appeals found that he had
lost his citizenship. 10 In 1953, Mr. Perez was discovered in the United
States, and proceedings were brought alleging illegal entry. When
the earlier rulings by the Board of Immigration Appeals were
reaffirmed, 1 Mr. Perez sued to challenge these rulings and
eventually found himself before the United States Supreme Court.
The Court took the occasion of Mr. Perez's appeal to consider the
question of whether Congress had the power to deprive citizens of
their citizenship as the consequence of their having done some
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) (1970).

9.. Id. § 1481 (a)(10).
10. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 46 (1958).
11. Id. at 47.
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forbidden act. In the case of Perez v. Brownell, 2 five members of the
Court held that Congress had this power.' 3 For some undisclosed
reason, the Court chose to rule upon the matter of voting in Mexico
rather than upon the draft evasion or the possible voluntary
renunciation. The majority held that to sanction voting abroad with
expatriation was reasonably related to permissible goals in the
exercise of the foreign affairs power. 14 The majority further ruled
that, while the act that results in the loss of citizenship must have
been done voluntarily, no proof of intent to lose citizenship was
necessary.1 5 Thus Mr. Perez became Sr. Perez.
Four members of the Court disagreed with the majority's
holding. Although the Perez case was hardly a sympathetic one, and
a court could reasonable have held him to have renounced his
16
citizenship through his wartime statements, Chief Justice Warren
and Justice Douglas1 7 wrote vigorous dissents, joined by Justice
Black, arguing that Congress had no power to deprive a citizen of
citizenship without that citizen's consent. Justice Whittaker, in a
separate dissent, was willing to accept the fact that Congress had
the power to deprive one of citizenship without consent, but he
thought the prescription of such loss for mere voting to be
unreasonable.ls
Perez v. Brownell was the first case to face squarely the question
of whether Congress had the power to revoke citizenship, 9 and to
address the limitations of this power. Perez would appear to have
resolved this question. However, two other cases were argued with
Perez, and their decisions were announced on the same day. 20 In
both of these other cases, the four dissenters from Perez were joined
by another justice to reverse lower court decisions in favor of the
Government. In Trop v. Dulles,2 1 Justice Whittaker even appeared to
12. Id. at 44.
13. Id. at 62.
14. Id. at 57-61.
15. Id. at 61-62.
16. Id. at 62-78 (joined by Justices Black and Douglas).
17. Id. at 79-84 (joined by Justice Black).
18. Id. at 84-85.
19. But see MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915). The MacKenzie case upheld
the constitutionality of the Act of March 2, 1907, § 6, 34 Stat. 1229, which revoked the
citizenship of a woman who married an alien, but this statute could be read as merely
suspending the citizenship. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 69-73 (1958); Rocha v.
INS, 450 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1971).
Another earlier case, Savorgnan v. United States, is sometimes cited as
sustaining nonconsensual expatriation. Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491
(1950). In this case, the petitioner, who had expressly renounced her United States
citizenship and lived abroad for four years, was unable to regain the citizenship by
showing that it was not her intent to lose it. The issue of constitutionality was not
raised.
20. Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
21. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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join his brother dissenters on Perez in concluding that the
government had no general power to divest citizenship. However, in
neither case did the fifth Justice agree with this premise. In Trop v.
Dulles, Justice Brennan concurred in the reversal, because the
provision in question 22 - expatriation because of wartime desertion
- had no "rational relation" to the exercise of the war power nor to
any other power of Congress. 23 In Nishikawa v. Dulles,24 some

members of the Court again argued lack of governmental power to
impose expatriation, 25 while others concluded that the Government
in fact had relied upon a voluntary expatriation but had failed to
26
prove it adequately.
In light of the uncertainty after these cases as to the scope or the
very existence of Congress' power to impose expatriation as an
unintended consequence of doing certain forbidden acts, one could
hope that the Court would expeditiously review challenges to various
expatriation provisions to settle the controversy. In the next six
years, three more expatriation cases reached the Supreme Court. In
two of these cases, the challenged expatriation provision was held to
be unconstitutional. 27 In the third case, the provision was upheld by
an evenly divided court. 28 Thus, of five cases decided in light of
Perez, four struck down the specific clause in issue as unconstitutional. Four justices emerged firmly committed to the theory that the
government had no power to divest citizens of their citizenship
without the citizens' consent. One or more justices found these
deprivations of citizenship deficient on various other grounds. At
best, the government only achieved an even split on the Court with
its arguments. Still, Perez settled the effect of voting abroad. But not
everyone agreed. Therefore, the Supreme Court decided to reconsider
29
Perez and voting abroad in the case of Afroyim v. Rusk.
Beys Afroyim happened to become involved in problems with
the State Department over his passport. Born in Poland, Mr.
22. See 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(8) (1970).
23. 356 U.S. at 114.

24. 356 U.S. 129 (1958).
25. Id. at 138.
26. Id. at 136-37.
27. The Kennedy case struck down section 1481(a)(10) of title 8 as cruel and
unusual punishment and lacking in the due process and procedural safeguards
mandated by the fifth and sixth amendments. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144 (1963); 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(10) (1970) (providing for expatriation for departing

or remaining outside the country to avoid the draft in time of national emergency).
The Schneider case held involuntary expatriation of naturalized citizens by residence
abroad to be a denial of due process, striking down section 1484 of title 8. Schneider v.
Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); 8 U.S.C. § 1484 (1970).
28. Marks v. Esperdy, 377 U.S. 214 (1964). This case involved section 1481(a)(3),
imposing expatriation for service in the armed forces of a foreign state. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1481(a)(3) (1970).

29. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
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Afroyim came to the United States in 1912 and became a citizen in
1926. In 1950 he went to Israel and began to vote there in 1951. His
application for renewal of his United States passport in 1960'was
refused because he had voted in Israel. Mr. Afroyim did not give up
despite Perez. Perhaps he was encouraged by the confusion in the
Court's opinions or perhaps he drew encouragement from other
sources. In any event, he sued, and he won. In Afroyim five members
of the Court held that Congress has no power to take away
citizenship without the citizen's assent,3 0 expressly overruling Perez.
In the course of his opinion for the majority, Mr. Justice Black wrote:
First we reject the idea expressed in Perez that, aside from
the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has any general power,
express or implied, to take away an American citizen's
citizenship without his assent. This power cannot, as Perez
indicated, be sustained as an implied attribute of sovereignty
possessed by all nations. Other nations are governed by their
own constitutions, if any, and we can draw no support from
theirs. In our country the people are sovereign and the
Government cannot sever its relationship to the people by taking
away their citizenship. Our Constitution governs us and we
must never forget that our Constitution limits the Government
to those powers specifically granted or those that are necessary
and proper to carry out the specifically granted ones. The
Constitution of course, grants Congress no express power to
strip people of their citizenship, whether in the exercise of the
implied power to regulate foreign affairs or in the exercise of any
specifically granted power....
Because the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment and the expatriation proposals which preceded and
followed it, like most other legislative history, contains many
statements from which conflicting inferences can be drawn, our
holding might be unwarranted if it rested 'entirely or principally
upon that legislative history. But it does not. Our holding we
think is the only one that can stand in view of the language and
the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, and our construction
of that Amendment, we believe, comports more nearly than
Perez with the principles of liberty and equal justice to all that
the entire Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to guarantee.
Citizenship is no light trifle to be jeopardized any moment
Congress decides to do so under the name of one of its general or
implied grants of power. In some instances, loss of citizenship
can mean that a man is left without the protection of citizenship
in any country in the world - as a man without a country.
Citizenship in this Nation is a part of a cooperative affair. Its
30. Id. at 268.
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citizenry is the country and the country is its citizenry. The very
nature of our free government makes it completely incongruous
to have a rule of law under which a group of citizens temporarily
in office can deprive another group of citizens of their
citizenship. We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment was
designed to, and does, protect every citizen of this Nation
against a congressional forcible destruction of his citizenship,
whatever his creed, color, or race. Our holding does no more than
to give to this citizen that which is his own, a constitutional
right to remain a citizen in a3 free country unless he voluntarily
relinquishes that citizenship. '
The foregoing language would seem to leave little doubt that
laws purporting to deprive a citizen of citizenship, other than those
recognizing a voluntary relinquishment, would be unconstitutional.
However, four justices - Harlan, Clark, Stewart, and White vigorously dissented.3 2 Furthermore, one could argue that only the
narrow issue of the effect of voting abroad was decided by the Court.
Under that view, only the validity of section 1481(a)(5) of title eight
of the U.S. Code (section 1481), which dealt with voting in foreign
elections,3 3 was resolved by the Court, and any broader language
was mere dictum. 34 However, former Attorney General Clark ruled
that Afroyim should be followed literally, 35 and applied to every law
which was designed to divest citizenship without the consent of the
citizen. Finally, in Rogers v. Bellei,36 all nine justices also read
Afroyim literally, although they disagreed over the issue of whether
some few citizens were entitled to constitutional protection of their
37
citizenship.
Mr. Afroyim thus provided the occasion for the enunciation of a
new constitutional principle - a citizen can voluntarily relinquish
citizenship, but the government can never deprive a person of
citizenship without the consent of that citizen. In other words, people
may abandon the government, but the government cannot abandon
them. The serious question remains as to how one determines
whether citizenship has been voluntarily renounced. This question
has not been faced by the Supreme Court since Afroyim, although it
31. Id. at 257, 267-68 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 268-93.
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) (1970).
34. For such an interpretation of Afroyim, see W. BisHop, INTERNATIONAL LAW
527 n.88 (3d ed. 1971).
35. 42 Op. ATr'Y GEN. No. 34 (Jan. 18, 1969); see also United State v. Matheson,
532 F.2d 809, 813 (2d Cir. 1976); Rocha v. INS, 450 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1971); Peter v.
Secretary of State, 347 F. Supp. 1035 (D.D.C. 1972).
36. 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
37. These unprotected citizens are those who acquire citizenship at birth,
although they are born in a foreign country. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970).
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has been treated by lower courts. 38 The following section examines
the alternative answers to this question, depending upon various
relevant factors which are likely to be present in the case of those
who departed from, or remained outside, the United States to avoid
military service during the period covered by President Carter's
pardon.
III.

EXPATRIATION OF THE DRAFT EVADERS

A.

Definite Losses of Citizenship

1. Adjudication.
As the New York Times reported,3 9 those who have been legally
declared "undesirable aliens" have lost their citizenship, presumably
because of the res judicata effect of a final judgment, at least after
all appeals have been exhausted, or the time for appeal has lapsed.
The truth of this statement needs no elaboration, but it does not
exhaust the possibilities of expatriation. One can voluntarily
expatriate oneself without going through a court.
2. Formal Renunciation
Section 1481(a)(6) provides for formal written renunciation of
citizenship before diplomatic or consular officers abroad on forms
prescribed by the Secretary of State. 40 Section 1481(a)(7) provides for
formal written renunciation in the United States on forms prescribed
by the Attorney General before officers designated by him during
time of war, subject to the Attorney General's decision that such
renunciation is not contrary to national defense needs. 4 1 Since
Afroyim recognized the constitutionality of voluntary renunciation,
these procedures appear to lie beyond constitutional challenge.
Nevertheless, important constitutional rights such as citizenship can
be waived only if the waiver is knowing and intelligent. 42 Thus,
several questions regarding the effectiveness of a formal renunciation could arise as to the voluntariness of the renunciation, the lack
of an intent to renounce, and the lack of capacity to renounce.
The first two questions are relatively easy to resolve. The law
was settled before Afroyim that formal renunciations must be
38. See United States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1976); King v. Rogers,
463 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1972); Jolley v. INS, 441 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 946 (1971); Peter v. Secretary of State, 347 F. Supp. 1035 (D.D.C. 1972); Baker v.
Rusk, 296 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
39. Mohr, supra note 4, at 1, col. 6.
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(6) (1970).
41. Id. § 1481(a)(7).
42. United States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809, 814 (2d Cir. 1976);
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voluntary. 43 Given the Court's insistence on voluntariness in
Afroyim, one cannot expect this conclusion to be challenged
successfully now.44 In the only case since Afroyim to raise the
argument of involuntariness, 45 a draft resister went to Canada -and
there renounced his citizenship. 46 When he was later found in the
United States, he was deported. He argued that he was coerced into
his renunciation by the threat of prosecution for violation of the
selective service laws. This argument was rejected on the ground
47
that he had the power to choose compliance or renunciation.
Merely acting out of conscience did not make the choice involuntary.

48

The question of the effect of a secret intent to retain citizenship
despite the execution of a formal renunciation has not been directly
decided by the Supreme Court. The case of Savorgnan v. United
States,49 does provide a close analogy, however. Mrs. Savorgnan had
become a naturalized Italian citizen at a time when such an act was
considered to be grounds for loss of United States citizenship. The
Court ruled that her intent to retain United States citizenship was
immaterial, stating that the acts mandating loss of citizenship were
"stated objectively. There is no suggestion in the statutory language
that the effect of the specified overt acts, when voluntarily done, is
50
conditioned upon the undisclosed intent of the person doing them.
This reasoning presumably applies to formal renunciations today. 51
43. Several cases arose out of numerous renunciations (4315) of citizenship by
Japanese-Americans interred at Tule Lake Relocation Center during World War II.
Three cases held that involuntary renunciations were ineffective, and given the
circumstances, these were all presumptively involuntary. McGrath v. Abo, 186 F.2d
766, 773 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 832 (1951) (class action); Acheson v.
Murakami, 176 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1949); Inouye v. Clark, 73 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Cal.
1947). As to voluntariness problems in related contexts, see Annot., 2 L. Ed. 2d 1917
(1958).
44. Sections 1481(b) and (c) also appear to presume that the loss of citizenship
must be through a voluntary act because these subsections create presumptions of
voluntariness as to the acts listed in section 1481(a). 8 U.S.C. § 1481(b), (c) (1970). The
constitutionality of these sections was questioned in United States v. Matheson, 532
F.2d 809, 818 n.5 (2d Cir. 1976).
45. Jolley v. INS, 441 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 946 (1971).
46. There is no indication that the renunciation complied with the formalities of
section 1481(a)(6). 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(6) (1970).
47. The existence of a choice distinguishes the Jolley case from Nishikawa v.
United States, 356 U.S. 129 (1958), where a Japanese-American was inducted into the
Japanese army without any opportunity to avoid service. See Jolley v. INS, 441 F.2d
1245, 1250 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 946 (1971).
48. Id. at 1251.
49. 338 U.S. 491 (1950).
50. Id. at 499-500.
51. Former Attorney General Clark concluded that manifestation of intent
controls, not a secret subjective intent. 42 Op. Arr'Y GEN. No. 34, at 4-5 (Jan. 18,
1969). Two courts which considered the problem assumed that a specific subjective
intent was necessary to accomplish a voluntary expatriation, but both allowed this
subjective intent to be proved by outward manifestations. Thus, both of these cases
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Capacity to make an effective renunciation may be a more
difficult matter to resolve. Lack of mental capacity through insanity,
or similar conditions, presents no problem different from the usual
factual ones. 52 The special incapacity arising from being a-minor
does present problems in this context. At least one court has held
that no minor born in the United States can validly renounce
citizenship.5 3 A more recent case construed the Nationality Act of

194054 as permitting renunciation at the age of eighteen, 55 since
several of its provisions made loss of nationality contingent on

doing the prohibited act after attaining the age of eighteen. Five
provisions of the current act refer to the age of eighteen, 56 while
several other provisions refer to older ages. 57 Nonetheless, the rule as
to capacity for expatriation purposes should be uniform. It should no
longer depend on variant state laws regarding the age of majority.
Given the lowering of the voting age to eighteen, the general trend to

drop the age of majority, and the fact that eighteen is the minimum
age at which Congress recognized any capacity to affect one's
citizenship, strong arguments exist for choosing this age as the

general line separating capacity from incapacity. Although this
outcome is not certain without litigation, Congress has provided for
capacity at eighteen for formal renunciations abroad.5 8 Congress
also limited the right to elect against the formal renunciation for six
disregard a secret, unexpressed intent. United States v. Matheson, 532 U.S. 809 (2d
Cir. 1976); King v. Rogers, 463 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1972).
52. Issues could also arise as to the nature of the mental limitation necessary, just
as in contractual capacity cases. See, e.g., Cundick v. Broadbent, 383 F.2d 157 (10th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 948 (1968); Smalley v. Baker, 262 Cal. App. 2d 824, 69
Cal. Rptr. 521 (1968); Star Realty, Inc. v. Bower, 17 Mich. App. 248, 169 N.W.2d 194

(1969); Faber v. Sweet Style Mfg. Corp., 40 Misc. 2d 212, 242 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1963).
53. United States ex rel. Baglivo v. Day, 28 F.2d 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1928). At the time
this case was decided, the age of majority was 21, and the court held that a nativeborn citizen under 21 could not validly renounce citizenship. The Supreme Court later
held that there could be no imputation of renunciation to a native-born minor. Perkins
v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939). Today's minors who acquired citizenship by naturalization
in the United States would be afforded the same protection as native-born citizen
minors. See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815
(1971).
54. Act of Oct. 14, 1940, ch. 876, §§ 101-505, 54 Stat. 1137 (repealed 1952).
55. McGrath v. Abo, 186 F.2d 766, 772 (9th Cir. 1959).
56. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481(a)(3), 1483(b) (1970) (§ 1483(b) cross refers to § 1481(a)(2), (4),

(5), (6)).
57. Id. § 1481(a)(1) (naturalization in a foreign state through application of parent
or guardian deemed ineffective if under 21); id. § 1482 (in case of dual nationals, return
to state of birth for more than three years deemed ineffective to divest United States
citizenship if under 22); id. § 1487 (parental expatriation deemed ineffective as to their
children if they are under 21). Of course, all of these provisions are invalid under
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967), but they are at least some evidence of
congressional intent as to capacity. Cf. Sweeney Gasoline & Oil Co. v. Toledo, P. &
W.R.R., 42 Ill. 2d 265, 269-70, 247 N.E.2d 603, 606 (1969) (Schaefer, J., dissenting)
(invalid statute evidence of legislative intent).
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1483(b) (1970).
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months after the eighteenth birthday. 59 Assuming the reasonableness of this regulation under Afroyim, those who formally renounced
citizenship abroad could not successfully argue lack of capacity due
to

age. Formal renunciation

within

the United States would

probably be treated similarly, although the statute does not
expressly so provide. Two provisions of the Act permit election
against expatriation until age twenty-five,60 creating at least some
61
room for argument. Both sections involve involuntary acts,
however, while formal renunciation within the United States would
be voluntary, thereby undermining this potential argument.
3. Informal Express Renunciations
At common law, one could not expatriate oneself without the
consent of the government whose citizenship one was surrendering. 62 For many years the United States championed citizens' rights
to control their own expatriation, even enacting a statute proclaiming this to be a natural and inherent right, denial of which was
inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Republic. 63 The
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, however, included
64
provisions which might have repealed this grand principle.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in Afroyim 65 and former Attorney

General Clark6 6 both assumed, without discussion, that voluntary
expatriation is possible without compliance with the formalities of
section 1481(a)(6) and (7).67 Since the statutes in question are
59. Id.
60. Id. §§ 1481(a)(1), 1487.
61. Id. Both involve expatriation of a minor through acts of a parent or guardian.
62. Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242 (1830).
63. Expatriation Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 186, 15 Stat. 223. This section was
formerly codified at 8 U.S.C. § 800 of the 1946 version of the United States Code.
Although 8 U.S.C. § 800 (1970) is not formally classified as repealed, it now appears
only as a historical note to 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1970).
Whereas the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people,
indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness; and whereas in the recognition of this principle this Government has
freely received emigrants from all nations, and invested them with the rights of
citizenship; and whereas it is claimed that such American citizens, with their
descendants, are subjects of foreign states, owing allegiance to the governments
thereof; and whereas it is necessary to the maintenance of public peace that this
claim of foreign allegiance should be promptly and finally disavowed; Therefore
any declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision of any officer of the
United States which denies, restricts, impairs, or questions the right of
expatriation, is declared inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the
Republic.
Id.
64. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1483(a), 1488 (1970). Both sections declare that there can be no
expatriation "under this part" except as provided therein.
65. 387 U.S. at 268.
66. 42 Op. Ar'Y GEN. No. 34, at 4-5 (Jan. 18, 1969).
67. But see Petition of Bautista, 183 F. Supp. 271 (D. Guam 1960) (renunciation of
citizenship before notary public in Philippines ineffective in view of noncompliance
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ambiguous, 68 these provisions should be read as they have
consistently been interpreted, at least until some authoritative body
rules otherwise.6 9 Thus, informal express renunciations are probably
effective.
If formal defects defeated an attempted formal renunciation, the
renunciation might qualify as an effective informal express
renunciation. 70 If these two classes receive different treatment as to
voluntariness, intent, or capacity, important consequences could
turn on this point. These problems probably would be resolved in the
same ways for both classes if only because litigation over formal
renunciations provides the only analogy available to guide resolution. On the other hand, the statutory provisions which determine
decisions with regard to formal renunciations do not directly apply
to informal renunciations. A court could modify somewhat the
outcome of litigation should a strong showing of injustice be
demonstrated.
B.

Implied Renunciations

1. General Considerations
If there is substantial doubt as to the validity of informal
express renunciations, one would expect even more theoretical
difficulty with the idea that conduct alone could manifest a
voluntary renunciation apart from any express renunciation.
Nevertheless, former Attorney General Clark71 and several federal
with statutory formalities for express renunciation); Furuno v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp.
775 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (insufficient evidence to show petitioner voluntarily expatriated
himself by performing services in another country open only to nationals of that
country). These cases can be central to this issue if read broadly, but confined to their
facts, they are unpersuasive. See Jolley v. INS, 441 F.2d 1245, 1247 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 946 (1971). The Jolley case expressly upheld an informal explicit
renunciation shown by petitioner's acts. Id.; accord, King v. Rogers, 463 F.2d 1188 (9th
Cir. 1972).
68. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1483(a), 1488 (1970). Since both prohibit expatriation "under
this part" except according to the forms therein provided, one can argue that the
statutes contemplate expatriations which are not "under this part." The question was

raised, but not decided, in Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 730-32 (1952).
69. One can also construct a due process argument to this effect. For other
pronouncements supporting this principle, see International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 2,
art. 3 I(I), 12(2) (1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 49, art. 1(1)
(1966); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71,
art. 13(2), 15(2) (1948); President Carter announced on March 17, 1977, his intention to
seek United States ratification of the covenants. N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1977, at A-10,
col. 6.
70. The issue was not raised in Petition of Bautista, 183 F. Supp. 271 (D. Guam

1960), where the court assumed formal defects nullified the attempted formal
renunciation.
71. 42 Op. ATT'Y GEN. No. 34, at 4-5 (,Jan. 18, 1969).
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courts 72 have assumed that such implicit renunciations are possi-

ble.7 3 If this assumption is correct, 74 the burden and degree of proof
necessary to show an implied voluntary renunciation remains
unclear. Section 1481(c) apparently provides a clear answer. The
party asserting the loss of nationality must establish the claimed
loss by a preponderance of the evidence. In deportation proceedings,
on the other hand, the evidence before the administrative board
must be "clear, unequivocal, and convincing." 75 The Supreme Court
in dictum in fact endorsed this latter standard of proof for any
attempt by the government to strip one of one's citizenship. 76 The
Court, however, cited only pre-1961 cases, leaving the precedential
value of this dictum in doubt, even if the issue arises in deportation
proceedings, rather than where an allegedly expatriated former
citizen seeks admission. 77 If the retention of citizenship involves
fundamental rights, 78 the Court might conclude that section 1481(c)
is unconstitutional7 9 and that "clear, unequivocal and convincing"
evidence is required. Since preponderance of the evidence would
more easily result in an inference of renunciation where none was
intended, the higher measure of proof is more consistent with the
Court's emphasis on actual voluntary renunciation announced in
Afroyim. One cannot be certain of the proper resolution of this issue
until the Court squarely confronts it, but considering the interests at
stake, some prediction is possible.
72. United States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809, 815 (2d Cir. 1976); King v. Rogers,
463 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1972); Peter v. Secretary of State, 347 F. Supp. 1035, 1039
(D.D.C. 1972); Baker v. Rusk, 296 F. Supp. 1244, 1246 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
73. Several members of the Supreme Court also adopted this position in separate
opinions at the time Perez was decided. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 68-69
(Warren, C.J., dissenting, with Black and Douglas, J.J., joining the opinion);
Nishikawa v. United States, 356 U.S. 129, 139 (1958) (Black, J., concurring, with
Douglas, J., joining).
74. A conclusion that implicit renunciations are possible could be based either on
a finding that 8 U.S.C. § 800 (1946) has not been implicitly repealed by 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1483(a), 1488 (1970), or on the theory that such a "natural and inherent right"
cannot be overridden by mere statutes. See text accompanying notes 64, 68 & 69
supra. See also United States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809, 818 n.5 (2d Cir. 1976).
75. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966).
76. Berenyi v. INS, 385 U.S. 630, 636 (1967); accord, Peter v. Secretary of State,
347 F. Supp. 1035 (D.D.C. 1972).
77. Section 1481(c) was enacted as Public Law 87-301 in 1961. The Court in
Woodby cites this section without discussing it, while apparently recognizing that it
contradicts its conclusions. 385 U.S. at 285 n.17.
78. See, e.g., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N.
Doc. A/810, art. 15 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, art. 24(3) (1966). See also
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160-61 (1963); Knauer v. United States,
328 U.S. 654, 657-60 (1946); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 670-71
(1944); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943); United States v.
Matheson, 532 F.2d 809, 818 (2d Cir. 1976).
79. The Matheson court suggested that it might be unconstitutional. United
States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809, 818 n.5 (2d Cir. 1976).
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So long as the degree of proof is uncertain, it cannot definitely be
determined whether the implication of intent to renounce must be
the only reasonable implication from the act or acts in question. If
the evidence must not only be clear and convincing, but also
"unequivocal," the government would be put to the difficult task of
amassing sufficient evidence so that the only reasonable inference
would be that of an intended voluntary renunciation. This situation
occurs rarely and since Afroyim was decided, no case has found a
renunciation without at least an informal express renunciation. One
case expressly required "clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence,",, and the other cases 81 have at least required a stronger showing
than mere preponderance of the evidence. Since loss of citizenship is
a substantial deprivation, particularly if one thereby becomes
stateless, 2 the most reasonable approach, as the cases discussed
below will show, would be to demand at least clear and convincing
evidence, perhaps even'requiring that the proof be unequivocal as
well. Even without the latter requirement, the government would
seldom be able to prove renunciation without an explicit statement
to that effect, since acts of disloyalty, even treason, have not
suggested clearly and convincingly a renunciation of citizenship to
the Supreme Court.8 3 Furthermore, this standard of proof would not
preclude a court from handling the general issues of voluntariness,
hidden intent, and capacity in the same manner as in situations of
express renunciation."4

There remains a possible argument that the doing of various
unlawful acts which Congress has sanctioned by the loss of
citizenship should be treated as raising a presumption of voluntary
85
renunciation. Thus far no court has accepted this argument.
Former Attorney General Clark ruled substantially similarly when
he asserted that these acts could raise such a presumption, but that
the individual shifts the burden of proof back to the government by
merely raising the issue of intent.8 6 This must be one of the most
easily rebutted presumptions in our law. In any event, no other
conclusion as to the burden of proof seems likely, without reversal of
80. Peter v. Secretary of State, 347 F. Supp. 1035, 1038 (D.D.C. 1972).
81. See cases cited at note 72 supra.
82. Fear of creating stateless persons was prominent in the majority's deliberations in Afroyim. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967). See also Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160-61 (1963). As to the general consequences of
statelessness, see 1 L.

OPPENHEIM,

INTERNATIONAL LAW 640 (8th ed. W. Lauterpacht

1955).
83. See Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952).
84. See text accompanying notes 43-61 supra.
85. See cases cited at note 72 supra.

86. 42 Op. ATT'Y GEN. No. 34, at 4 (Jan. 18, 1969). The former Attorney General
apparently relied on 8 U.S.C. § 1481(c) (1970) for this interpretation.
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Afroyim in substance, since the citizen would often be hard pressed
to produce other than self-serving declarations as evidence to rebut
any stronger presumption. A further issue for discussion involves
the probative strength of the various proscribed acts. These acts will
be grouped according to certain common facts shared by several of
the acts: assumption of the burdens and benefits of foreign
citizenship; avoidance of certain duties of United States citizenship;
or prolonged residence abroad.
2. Acts Demonstrating the Acceptance of the Burdens and
Benefits of Foreign Citizenship
Congress has prescribed expatriation for the doing of a number
of acts which to varying degrees indicate that the individual has
chosen to act in ways which normally could only be performed by, or
would result in that individual becoming, a citizen of another
country. These acts include becoming naturalized under the laws of
another country,8 7 giving an oath of allegiance to a foreign
government,8 8 serving in foreign armed forces without prior written
authorization by the Secretaries of State and Defense,8 9 accepting
any position which results in naturalization or requires an oath of
allegiance, 90 and voting in a foreign election.9 1 Jody Powell
apparently referred to this grouping of activities when he asserted
that draft evaders who had become foreign citizens were no longer
United States citizens. 92 If Afroyim stands for anything, it must
certainly announce that these provisions do not result in expatriation unless they manifest the intent of the citizen to expatriate
himself.
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized dual
nationality as a genuine status under United States law.93 Although
Congress attempted to discourage dual nationality in several
87. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481(a)(1), 1487 (1970).
88. Id. § 1481(a)(2).
89. Id. § 1481(a)(3).
90. Id. § 1481(a)(4). This section overlaps with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481(a)(1), (2) (1970).
Historically, section 1481(a)(4) derived from prohibitions of employment reserved to
foreign citizens. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
[1952] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1653.
91. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) (1970).
-92.-See note 3 supra.
93. Afroyim resulted in a dual (Israeli/American) national. For Supreme Court
cases recognizing dual nationality, see Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939); Shanks v.
Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242 (1830). For international proceedings which resulted in
recognition of dual nationality involving the United States, see Merg6 Case (United
States v. Italy), [1955] I.L.R. 443, 6 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 236; Tellech Case (United
States v. Austria & Hungary), Dec. Tripartite Cl. Comm. 71, 6 R.Int'l Arb. Awards
248 (1928); Alexander Case (United Kingdom v. United States), 3 Moore, Arb. 2529
(1898).
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95
enactments, 94 these provisions are clearly unconstitutional today.
Dual nationality is a real possibility under our law. Given this
possibility, it is difficult to see how becoming a citizen of a foreign
country, or acting in ways which indicate allegiance to a foreign
country, may be interpreted as evidence of an intent to renounce
United States citizenship. The possibility of an intent to become a
dual national is strong enough to preclude a statutory presumption
or even a simple inference of voluntary renunciation. Consequently,
courts faced with these specific acts have refused to find a voluntary
renunciation from the doing of any of these acts. The Afroyim case
itself involved voting in a foreign election, which was deemed not to
97
have resulted in expatriation. 96 In Peter v. Secretary of State,
working on Hungarian (State) Radio and traveling on a Hungarian
passport did not result in expatriation. In Baker v. Rusk, 98 swearing
allegiance to the Queen, in order for a dual Canadian/American
citizen to become a member of the Alberta bar, did not result in
expatriation. If these acts separately are insufficient, combining
them adds little weight, unless the result yields a pattern so
inconsistent with retention of United States citizenship as to clearly
convince the court of this intent. 99
The most recent case involving a claim of expatriation from the
doing of acts showing allegiance to a foreign state is United States
00
v. Matheson.1
In 1944 Dorothy Gould Burns married a Mexican
citizen in Mexico, thereby becoming a Mexican national herself. In
order to obtain a certificate of her Mexican nationality, she swore an
oath abjuring her right to any protection from the government of her
nationality of origin. 10 1 Mrs. Bums subsequently behaved in many
respects as a United States citizen. She traveled on United States

94. In addition to sections 1481(a)(2), (3), (4), and (5), all of which could trip up
unwary dual nationals, section 1482 specifically expatriates dual nationals who reside
in a foreign country where they are citizens by birth unless they swear an oath of
allegiance to the United States, or unless they meet the exceptions under sections 1485
and 1486. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481(a)(2), (3), (4), (5), 1482, 1485, 1486 (1970).
95. The provisions are unconstitutional not only in light of Afroyim, but also on
due process grounds under the rationale of Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964). An
important exception to this unconstitutionality would exist where the dual national
was born abroad and acquired his nationality through an American parent. See
Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
96. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).

97. 347 F. Supp. 1035 (D.D.C. 1972).
98. 296 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1969). The court observed that the oath might be
evidence of expatriation, but not where the individual did not acquire a new

citizenship.

99. Perez v. Brownell,.356 U.S. 44, 68 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
100. 532 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1976).

•101. The oath sworn by Mrs. Burns was as follows:

I herewith formally declare my allegiance, obedience, and submission to the
laws and authorities of the Republic of Mexico; I expressly renounce all protection
foreikn to said laws and authorities and any right which treaties or international
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passports, took tax benefits as a United States citizen, and registered

with foreign governments as a United States citizen. She also made
frequent private representations of her United States citizenship. On
the other hand, she also acted as a Mexican citizen. She obtained a
Mexican passport and traveled on it. She also gained expedited entry

into Mexico for her daughter by a previous marriage. When Mrs.
Burns died, her executor asserted that she had renounced her
citizenship in 1944, and thereby owed no inheritance taxes in the
United States. The court construed her oath as being merely a
promise not to invoke United States protection against Mexico
rather than an express renunciation of the United States citizenship.10 2 Thus, her oath became merely an express acknowledgement
of the usual legal relationship of a dual national to each of the states
of which that person is a national. 10 3 Each state is entitled to treat

the dual national as its own citizen and need not respond to
international claims by the other state. 104 Given the heavy burden of
proof 05 necessary to hold a citizen to have expatriated himself, the
court held that the other acts of Mrs. Burns coupled with this oath so
completely failed to present a case of voluntary renunciation that a

summary judgment in the Government's favor was upheld in the
face of proffered oral testimony as to Mrs. Burns' understanding and
06
intent.1
All of the cases since Afroyim have concluded that the doing of
acts evincing allegiance to another country does not demonstrate
voluntary renunciation absent clear, independent proof of an intent
law grant to foreigners, expressly furthermore agreeing not to invoke with respect
to the Government of the Republic any right inherent in my nationality of origin.
Id. at 811.
102. Id. at 816.
103. See, e.g., Tellech Case (United States v. Austria & Hungary), Dec. Trip. Cl.
Comm. 71, 6 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 248 (1928); Canevdro Case (Italy v. Peru), Hague Ct.
Rep. (Scott) 284 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1912). But see also Merg6 Case (United States v. Italy),
6 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 236 (1955); Grigoriou Case (Greece v. Bulgaria), [19241 Ann.
Dig. 243 (raising the possibility of a "dominant nationality").
104. The treatment of "Calvo" clauses as found in the Mexican Constitution is
analogous. MEX. CONST. art. 27. The clause provides that foreign investors cannot
seek the protection of their home government. See El Oro Mining & Ry. Case (United
Kingdom v. Mexico), 5 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 191 (1931); Mexican Union Ry. Case
(United Kingdom v. Mexico), 5 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 115 (1930); North American
Dredging Co. of Texas Case (United States v. Mexico), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 26
(1926). See generally W. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS
ABROAD 792-816 (1915); 5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 635-54
(1943); 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 994-98 (2d ed. 1945); Garcia-Mora, The Calvo
Clause in Latin-American Constitutions and InternationalLaw, 33 MARQ. L. REV. 205
(1950).
105. In Matheson, this burden of proof was stated as "clear, convincing and
unequivocal." United States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809, 818 (2d Cir. 1976).
106. Id. The Court gave an alternate basis for its holding, however, in the form of
an estoppel against the estate since Mrs. Burns had sought and received the benefits
of United States citizenship during her life. Id. at 819-20.
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to renounce. The clearest proof of such intent would be an explicit
renunciation of United States citizenship. i0 7 Some countries,
including the United States,10 8 do require such a renunciation as
part of their naturalization process, but this required renunciation is
not universal. It happens that Canada does not require an oath
abjuring citizenship as part of its naturalization process. 10 9 Therefore, in the case of most draft evaders who became citizens of
Canada, at least, the question of expatriation finally rests upon the
determination of whether their acts of disloyalty to the United States
demonstrate conclusively a voluntary renunciation.
3. Avoidance of the Burdens of
United States Citizenship
Congress has also prescribed expatriation for several acts in
derogation of United States citizenship: desertion from the military
in time of war;1 10 treason, attempts to overthrow the government, or
conspiracy to overthrow the governemnt; 111 and departing or
remaining outside the United States for the purpose of avoiding
military service in time of war or national emergency.' 1 2 Each of
these provisions was involved in a case before the Supreme Court
prior to the Afroyim decision, and each provision was denied
application in the case before the Court. In Trop v. Dulles, 113 the
desertion provision was declared unconstitutional either because
there was no rational relationship between the expatriation and
congressional powers, including the war power," 4 or because
expatriation was cruel and unusual punishment. 1 5 In Kennedy v.
107. See, e.g., King v. Rogers, 463 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1972).
108. 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a)(2) (1970). This section perhaps is the source of the idea that
an American naturalized abroad usually renounces his American citizenship, as
assumed by Press Secretary Jody Powell, or as occasionally stated as dictum in cases.
See, e.g., Baker v. Rusk, 296 F. Supp. 1244, 1247 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
109. The Canadian oath is:
OATH OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A. B., swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty
Queen Elizabeth the Second, her Heirs and Successors, according to law, and that
I will faithfully observe the laws of Canada and fulfill my duties as a Canadian
citizen.
So help me God.
1 CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-19, at 27 (1970). For the section specifying these oaths as the
oaths required of new citizens, see 1 CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-19, § 12 (1970).
110. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(8) (1970).
111. Id. § 1481(a)(9).
112. Id. § 1481(a)(10).
113. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
114. Id. at 105-14 (Justice Brennan's conclusion).
115. Id. at 93-104 (the conclusion of four justices, written by Warren, C.J.). These
four justices also argued that Congress in any event had no power to deprive citizens
of their citizenship. Id. at 87-93; see text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
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Mendoza-Martinez,116 the provision regarding departure to avoid
military service was held an unconstitutional punishment because it
was not imposed subject to the safeguards found in the fifth and
sixth amendments.' 1 7 Neither holding precludes a subsequent
conclusion that these acts are so inconsistent with an intent to
remain a citizen as to be "clear, convincing and unequivocal"
evidence of a voluntary renunciation. However, the outcome of
Kawakita v. United States"' 8 seems to preclude such a conclusion,
perhaps suggesting that these acts, like acts of allegiance to a
foreign state or even in combination with acts of allegiance to a
foreign state, do not prove voluntary expatriation.
Tomoya Kawakita was born in 1921 in the United States of
Japanese parents. In 1939 he went to Japan and entered a Japanese
university. He was registered there as an United States citizen. Being
unable to return to the United States when he finished his schooling
in 1943, he registered as a Japanese citizen and took a job as an
interpreter for a Japanese company. In this capacity he supervised
Americans held as prisoners of war who were assigned to work for
his employer. He repeatedly denounced the United States. After the
war, Mr. Kawakita was accused of treason both for having
contributed to the Japanese war effort, and for having mistreated
American prisoners of war. The Court held that none of Mr.
Kawakita's acts resulted in a loss of citizenship "as a matter of
law"' 9 even though at that time the doing of the various
expatriating acts was upheld as valid and effective in bringing
about an involuntary expatriation. Despite the dissent's argument
that he had "expatriated himself as well as that can be done,"' 120 Mr.
Kawakita's sentence of death was nevertheless affirmed.
If even treason is not so inconsistent with the retention of
citizenship, even a treason coupled with acts expressing allegiance
to a foreign government at war with the United States, as to clearly
and convincingly prove a voluntary renunciation of citizenship, the
less serious offenses of desertion or remaining out of the country to
avoid military service in time of national emergency cannot be held
to raise a presumption of renunciation. In Kawakita, the majority
was persuaded at least in part that Mr. Kawakita was acting as a
dual national, i.e., in the exercise of his duties as a Japanese citizen,

116. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).

117. Id. at 167.
118. 343 U.S. 717 (1952) (4-3 decision).
119. Id. at 722-27. While Mr. Kawakita might have escaped punishment altogether
had the decision been otherwise, he would have no different position than any other
person who held only Japanese citizenship.
120. Id. at 746 (Vinson, C.J., Black & Burton, JJ., dissenting).
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and not in derogation of his duties as an United States citizen. 121 At
the very least, this conclusion applies as well to draft evaders who
sought to acquire foreign citizenship. Thus, the acquisition of foreign
citizenship, far from weakening their claim to citizenship, might well
strengthen it. Like the late Mr. Kawakita, draft evaders who
acquired a foreign, e.g., Canadian, citizenship have acted to fulfill
themselves under their new citizenship, and not to derogate their
United States citizenship. But should persons who never sought to
give up their United States citizenship or to acquire another
citizenship, be treated more harshly than those who did? Given the
judicial abhorrence of the statelessness 1 22 which would result if acts
of disloyalty not coupled with the acquisition of a foreign citizenship
were construed as renunciations, courts probably will not draw such
inferences. It appears that these grounds, even in combination with
other proscribed acts, would provide a weak basis for proving
renunciation in the absence of such independent evidence as express
renunciations of citizenship. Moreover, the burden of proof lies with
the government since it is alleging the loss of citizenship.
4. Prolonged Residence Abroad
Congress has provided that prolonged residence abroad for
certain classes of citizens results in expatriation. One statute
provides that dual nationals at birth lose their United States
citizenship by three years of continuous residence in'the other state
of their nationality after age twenty-two, unless they take an oath of
allegiance to the United States within the three years. 123 Another
statute states that naturalized citizens lose their citizenship for three
years of continuous residence in the country of former nationality, or
for five years of continuous residence in any foreign state. 24 Finally,
Congress also provided that a citizen under the age of twenty-one
who resides abroad also loses his United States nationality if he
acquires the nationality of the foreign state wherein he resides,
subject to election against the loss until age twenty-five. 25 In
Schneider v. Rusk,' 26 a naturalized woman, who was deemed
expatriated for three years of continuous residence in the country of
her birth, challenged the constitutionality of her expatriation. The
Court found the classification scheme to be so discriminatory as to

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 723-25, 732-36.
See note 82 supra.
8 U.S.C. § 1482 (1970). Exceptions are found in id. § 1485.
Id. § 1484. Exceptions are found in id. §§ 1485, 1486.
Id. § 1487.
377 U.S. 163 (1964).
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violate the guarantee of due process in the fifth amendment. 127 This
reasoning seems to apply as well to each provision relating to
residence abroad. The provisions would be void not only for
imposing involuntary expatriation upon citizens in violation of the
holding of Afroyim, but also for treating citizens unequally which is
not permitted as regards fourteenth amendment citizens.
Many citizens by birth or through naturalization reside abroad
for many years for a wide variety of reasons with no intent to
renounce their citizenship. The act of residing abroad is so
ambiguous in itself that one can draw no reasonable inference of
renunciation from that act alone. Nor would this ambiguity be
clarified when coupled with other equally ambiguous acts. In this
area as well, little short of an explicit renunciation of citizenship
would suffice.
5.

Combined Acts of Expatriation

Many draft evaders were, in fact, absent for prolonged periods
for the purpose of avoiding their military service obligations while at
the same time acquiring a foreign citizenship. If this occurred in
128
Canada, there still may well have been no explicit renunciation.
Since such acts could be consistent with retention of United States
citizenship, and since the intent could easily have been to become a
dual national, there is certainly no unequivocal renunciation. Nor
can these acts be a more clear and convincing renunciation than
Tomoya Kawakita's registration as a Japanese citizen, service in the
Japanese mining industry, and abuse of Americans held as
prisoners of war. 129 According to Justice Douglas, Kawakita's acts
were ambiguous,1 30 a recognition of the foreign citizenship, instead
of a derogation of the United States citizenship. If an implication of
renunciation under his circumstances was not so much more
reasonable than any other inference as to be clear and convincing
proof of renunciation, the draft evader who has performed acts in
each of the categories prescribed by Congress as expatriating acts,
likewise would not have clearly and convincingly expatriated.
himself. The case against draft evaders becomes even weaker if any
of these acts were omitted by the individual. Proof of expatriation in
the absence of some explicit denial of citizenship appears to be
virtually impossible.

127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 168.
See note 109 supra.
Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952).
Id. at 723-24.
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C. Non-Fourteenth Amendment Citizens
The citizenship of a few of the draft evaders may not be
protected by the fourteenth amendment.13 1 In Rogers v. Bellei, 3 2 the
Court held that a person who acquired citizenship at birth outside
the United States 1 33 was not constitutionally protected in that
citizenship. Congress could condition the citizenship on reasonable
requirements. Where the citizenship is acquired at birth because only
one of the child's parents is a qualifying United States citizen, the
citizenship is lost if the child does not spend at least five continuous
years in the United States between the ages of fourteen and twentyeight. 3 4 This specific provision was upheld in Rogers v. Bellei.
Whatever one thinks of the logic of this case, draft evaders who so
acquired their citizenship, have lost it if they did not reside in the
United States for five continuous years after the age of fourteen and
before the age of twenty-eight.
One other possible group of non-fourteenth amendment citizens
1 35
may be American Indians. The very old case of Elk v. Wilkins
held that Indians did not acquire United States citizenship under the
fourteenth amendment. Congress in 1924 conferred citizenship on all
Indians in the United States. 36 Today, this action might be viewed
as a naturalization within the United States, and Indians born
subsequent to the act might be considered fourteenth amendment
citizens for birth in the United States. Nevertheless, Elk v. Wilkins
did hold that the fourteenth amendment was not intended to reach
Indians. Since the fourteenth amendment would also affect their
relations with the state in which they live, this holding might be
reaffirmed. Draft evaders within this class might also, then, have
lost their citizenship.
IV.

SUMMARY OF THE CITIZENSHIP STATUS

OF DRAFT EVADERS

The following classes of draft evaders have lost their citizenship:
those who have been formally adjudicated to have lost their
citizenship; those who have formally renounced their citizenship;
those who have informally expressly renounced their citizenship;
131. See note 6 supra.
132. 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
133. The citizenship may be acquired because one or both parents are citizens or
nationals of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(3), (4), (7) (1970).
134. Id. § 1401(b), (c).
135. 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
136. Citizenship Act of 1924, Pub. L. 175, 43 Stat. 253 (reprinted at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(a)(2) (1970)). An earlier act had granted citizenship to nonreservation Indians.
Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, §6, 24 Stat. 390.
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and those whose citizenship was not protected by the fourteenth
amendment since they were neither born nor naturalized in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof and who have
failed to comply with conditions on their citizenship. As t6 any other
draft evader, there is a heavy burden of proof on the government,
and a consistent pattern of resolving all ambiguities in favor of the
citizen. Given the possibility of dual allegiance, the various acts are
necessarily ambiguous when not coupled with explicit denials of
citizenship. Thus, nearly all other draft evaders - including those
naturalized in Canada, which does not require explicit abjuration of
foreign citizenship - would remain citizens of the United States
unless the government can prove that the combination of their
actions is so inconsistent with an intention not to renounce United
States citizenship that one is compelled to infer that renunciation.
Given the consistent treatment of the evidence adduced in cases up
to now, this inference could very rarely, if ever, be drawn without
proof of explicit denial or renunciation of the citizenship.
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